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S'TATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and 
property dam'age arising from an intersection col-
lision at Second South and Third West in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court 1after acknowledging it erred 
in the instructing of the jury (R. 51) granted: (a) 
Defendant's Motion for a Judgment of Non-Suit, 
and (b) Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Jury 
Verdict and for a Judgment in favor of the De-
fendants, Non Obstante Veredicto (R. 87 & R. 88). 
Further, the lower court denied the defendant's 
Motion for1a New Trial (R. 88). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants want the judgment affirmed. 
However, if the judgment of the lower court is not 
affirmed, then the lower court should be directed 
to grant defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF MA'TERIAL FACTS 
The appellant's Statement of Facts is incom-
plete. 
The accident happened at a:bout 4 :45 P.M. on 
May 31, 1962, at the intersection of 2nd South and 
Third West in Salt Lake City (R. 105). The weather 
was dry and clear ( R. 105) and the blacktop was 
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dry ( R. 106) . The streets at this intersection are 
level ( R. 125). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 shows that this inter-
section, 2nd South Street, is 92' 2" wide from curb 
to curb west of Third West, and that Third West is 
approximately the same width at the intersection, 
being 91' 5" wide from curb to curb. Exhibit No. 
1 was prepared and drawn by Officer Nicholson who 
was called as the plaintiff's witness and is drawn 
to a scale of 1" = 10 feet (R. 110). A stop sign is 
located 24' 6" north of the north curb of 2nd South 
to control traffic entering the intersection from the 
north. 
In the course of his investigation Officer Nich-
olson determined that the point of impact occurred 
56' 2" south of the north curb of 2nd South and 
77' 10" east of the west curb of Third West, (Ex-
hibit No. 1) . The large dot on Exhibit No. 1 indi-
cates the point where Officer Nicholson determined 
the impact between the vehicles occurred ( R. 113). 
After the impact Officer Nicholson found ~hat the 
truck had moved easterly 20' 7" and that Mr. John-
son's automobile had been moved so that no measure-
ments as to the distance it had traveled could be 
taken (R. 129). However, Exhibit No. 1 shows the 
path ~ll'. Johnson's vehicle traveled after the im-
pact across the intersection and to where it came 
to rest in the northeast quadi'!a.nt of the intersec-
tion. 
Exhibit No. 4, an aerial photograph, depicts 
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the intersection from the air and clearly shows it 
to be an unobstructed intersection. Officer Nichol-
son testified the view of each driver toward the 
other W1as open ( R. 117) , and that the little building 
used as a watch building did not obstruct the view 
of the drivers (R. 117 and R. 118). Officer Nichol-
son also said that the curb on the west side of Third 
West north of the intersection was painted red, and 
that this was 1a "No Parking" area, so that parked 
cars next to the curb would not be in a position to 
interfere with the drivers' vision (R. 117). 
On examination Mr. Johnson, the plaintiff, 
stated (R. 208) there were no obstacles which would 
have kept him from seeing Mr. James' red truck. 
Officer Nicholson testified that 1at 'the time of the 
accident Mr. J·ohnson told him his vehicle was three 
feet away from the truck when he first observed 
it (R. 118), and on further examination, Officer 
Nicholson said Mr. Johnson said he did not see the 
truck before his distance of danger which was three 
feet ( R. 1'28). Prior to the trial Mr. Johnson's 
deposition was taken, and in the deposition and on 
cross examination Mr. Johnson told everyone that 
as he approached the intersection, he saw the truck 
stopped at the stop sign when his vehicle was 150' 
to 200' west of the west curb of Third West, (R. 
209). Exhibit No. 1 was marked with a rectangular 
box under the words, "Left Only" at the west edge 
of 'the Exhibit, and in this rectangul1ar box were in-
serted the letters, "PO" for point of observation, to 
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show the point of observation at the time of the 
deposition ( R. 209). At the trial on direct examina-
tion from Mr. Hunt, Mr. Johnson testified that he 
saw the truck stopped at the stop sign with other 
traffic when he was a:bout 75' west of the west curb 
of Third South, and to assist Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hunt 
placed a black horizontal mark (R. 141) on Exhibit 
No. 1 to show the new observation point at the time 
of trial. 
Prior to the collision Mr. Johnson was driving in 
'nn easterly direction on 2nd South in the inside 
through lane (R. 105) at a speed of 20 to 2'5 m.p.h. 
(R. 118). Further, he stated his brakes were all 
right (R. 241) and that prior to the impact he did 
not apply his brakes (R. 210). Mr. Johnson claimed 
to be an experienced driver (R. 21'3) and that he 
had good reflex action such as any normal pe~son 
(R. 213) and that if he had seen the truck he could 
have stopped his vehicle in 75 feet (R. 2'14). He 
did not slow his vehi'Cle as he entered the in tersec-
tion, and he told Officer Nicholson that his speed 
was 20 to 25 m.p.h. (R. 118), and that he did not 
see the danger of collision with the truck until he 
was three feet from it, and did not see the truck 
before his distance of danger of three feet ( R. 1'28) . 
On lookout ~and observation (R. 229) Mr. John-
son testified as follows: 
''Q. Well, would it be correct to say that 
your car was approximately 200 feet· west of 
the west curb of 3rd South - or excuse me -
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of 3rd West when you saw his truck stopping 
at the stop-sign?" 
"A. Wen, I wouldn't know whe,ther it 
was 200 feet. 
"Q. Well, would it be 150 more nearly 
or 250 feet? ' 
"A. Well, I dare say it would be some-
where around 150 to '200 feet. 
"Q. At "that time you were driving 
twenty to twenty-five miles an hour? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And in the inside eastbound traffic 
lane? 
"A. Inside eastbound traffic lane. 
''A. From that time until the collision 
occurred did you see 'Mr. James' truck again? 
"A. No, sir, I did not. 
"Q. What color of truck was he driv-
ing? 
"'A. Red truck." 
Mr. Johnson had no re'al opportunity to observe 
the speed of the defendant's truck and testified (R. 
231) thaJt he did not know the speed of the defend-
ant's truck. 
Mr. James, the defendant truck driver, testi-
fied he stopped his truck in the inside southbound 
lane on Third West, and that he stopped north of 
the crosswalk. Mr. James marked Exhibit No. 14 
(R. 249) to show where he stopped 1and that the 
front of his truck was north of the crosswalk. Mr. 
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James waited at the stop sign for six or seven cars 
going west to cross the intersection and waited per-
haps for a period of four or five seconds ( R. 249). 
Mr. James said traffic was pretty heavy ( R. 250), 
and that ·when he saw a break in it, he started out. 
Before starting out Mr. James observed Mr. John-
son's car 150' to 200' west of the west curb of Third 
\Yest ( R. 250). There were no vehicles stopped or 
parked to the right of Mr. James' truck ( R. 251) . 
Mr. James proceeded in the truck into the inter~ 
section using third gear ( R. 252) and did not see 
the danger of a collision prior to the collision ( R. 
~52). Mr. James started out from "0" m.p.h., and 
at the time of the impact he said his truck was going 
8 or 9 m.p.h. on direct examination (R. 252); how-
ever, on cross examination Mr. James admitted that 
his truck was going 8, 9, or 10 m.p.h. at the time of 
collision. 
By stipulation of counsel, Exhibit No. 15 was 
received in evidence (R. 2'64). Exhibit No. 15 is 
a chart prepared by Sam Taylor, former Salt Lake 
City Traffic Engineer. This chart was prepared 
for the Utah Safety Council. To make Sam Taylor's 
chart applicable to the problem, it was stipulated 
by counsel that the coefficiency of friction on the 
roadway in question at the time in question was 45 
per cent ( R. 266). The Utah Safety Council chart 
shows, at a speed of 20 m.p.h., using 34 of a second 
reaction time, the plaintiff's vehicle would have tra-
veled 22' during the reaction time period, and that 
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with merely passable brakes it would have traveled 
30 additional feet during the braking period, and 
that the total stopping distance would have been 
52 feet. Further, the same chart shows, using 3;4 
of a second reaction time, at 25 m.p.h., Mr. Johnson 
would have traveled 2'7¥2 feet during the reaction 
time period, and with merely passable brakes, 4 7 
feet would have been required to brake to a stop, 
and that the total stopping distance should not have 
exceeded 7 4lf2 feet. It is to be recalled that Mr. 
Johnson testified he did not apply his brakes (R. 
2'10) and that his brakes were all right (R. 241). 
Officer Nicholson, the investigating police of-
ficer, is a g11aduate of the University of Utah (R. 
116). He testified that he found no brake marks by 
either vehicle prior to the collision (R. 113). Fur-
ther, while testifying for the plaintiff as plaintiff's 
witness, Mr. Hunt, the plaintiff's attorney, asked 
Officer Nicholson's expert advice as to the cause of 
the accident (R. 114) and was told it occurred be-
cause neither driver saw the other. Even Mr. John-
son adm'itted (R. 208) that there was no ·dbstacle 
which would have kept him from seeing Mr. James' 
truck. 
A verdict was returned for the plaintiff, be-
cause in the instructions the Trial Court erred pre-
judiciously in the giving of two instructions, or in 
failing to instruct tha:t the plaintiff was negligent 
as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper look-
out. 'The Court (R. 48) instructed thaJt the defend-
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ant was negligent as a matter of law in not keep-
ing a proper lookout 1and entering the intersection 
at a time when it was not safe to enter, and then 
handicapped the race in favor of the plaintiff by 
giving Instruction 9-L (R. 51) saying the fact the 
defendant was involved in a collision was prima facie 
evidence that the plaintiff had the right-of-way._ 
\Vith regard to Instruction 9-L, It is to he noted 
(R. 51) that after the return of the verdict, the 
trial judge acknowledged in writing on Instruction 
9-L he committed error in giving this instruction. 
However, the trial court was convinced the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
in not keeping a proper lookout and not yielding ~he 
right-of-way (R. 87 and R. 88), and it did not grant 
a new trial to the defendants and their Motion for 
a New Trial was denied (R. 87 and R. 88). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO KEEP 
A PROPER LOOKOUT THE PLAINTIFF'S CON'TRI-
BUTARY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
THE ACCIDENT. 
This ~accident occurred at an unobstructed in-
tersection. The view of each driver toward the other 
was open ( R. 117) . Mr. James, the defendant truck 
driver, was driving a large red truck (R. 208, R. 
229, and R. 230). Mr. Johnson stated there was no 
obstacle which would have kept him from seeing the 
truck Mr. James was driving (R. 208). The p~ain-
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tiff's attorney, Mr. Hunt, on direct examina-
tion of Officer Nicholson, asked the officer 
why the accident occurred (R. 114) and was told 
it happened because neither driver saw the other. 
After the accident Mr. Johnson told Officer Nichol-
son he did not see the truck until he Wlas three feet 
from colliding with it (R. 118 and R. 128). Mr. 
Johnson admitted he did not apply his brakes prior 
to the accident ( R. 210) . There was no vehicle to 
the right of the defendant's truck to hide it (R. 251). 
Mr. James stopped his truck north of the crosswalk, 
(Exhibit 14) and proceeded into the intersection 
turning east when he was 8' or 1 0' north of the cen-
ter line of 2nd South Street (R. 254). The truck 
was in third gear at the time of the collision ~and 
reached a speed not exceeding 10 m.p.h. according 
to Mr. James at the time of the collision (R. 252). 
Mr. James came from a complete stop, having wait-
ed for six or seven cars to pass before entering the 
intersection ( R. 24 9) . Mr. Johnson admitted he did 
not know the speed of the defendant's truck (R. 
231), and on direct examination of Officer Nichol-
son by Mr. Hunt, Officer Nicholson told Mr. Hunt 
he believed the truck stopped before entering the 
intersection (R. 115). 
It is 80' from the north edge of the crosswalk 
to the point of impact on a straight line. In other 
words, the front of the truck when stopped was 80' 
from the point of impact. In actuality, the truck 
entered the intersection going southward until it 
10 
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was 8' or 1 0' north of the center of the street, and 
th(ln turned easterly, and the actual distance tra-
veled by the 'truck would have been in excess of 80 
feet. Mr. James' average speed in entering the in-
tersection, starting from "0" m.p.h. and going to a 
maximum of 10 m.p.h. would have been 5 m.p.h. 
At 5 m.ph. the truck was traveling 7.3'5 feet per 
spcond, and it would have taken the truck over 10 
seconds to reach the point of impact from the time 
the entry to the intersection started. In other words 
Mr. Johnson had a:t least ten seconds in which to 
observe the danger of a collision, but did nothing 
about observing it until he was three feet from the 
point of impact and at a time when he had some-
thing less than 'a split second in which to observe 
the danger of a collision. 
At the time Mr. Johnson observed the danger 
of a collision, he was going 20 to 25 m.p.h. (R. 2'28). 
In the split second in which Mr. Johnson ob-
served the danger, he did not have time to brake 
and could not avoid a collision. 
Under these circumstances, would all reason-
'able men believe Mr. Johnson was keeping a proper 
lookout? It is the defendant-respondents' contention 
that in failing to observe the danger for ten seconds 
while driYing his vehicle toward ·and entering an 
intersection, Mr. Johnson was negligent as a matter 
of law. 
In Bemon vs. The Denver & Rio Grande West-
etn Railroad Co. (19'55) 4 Uta:h 2d 38, 286, P. '2d 
11 
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790, where the plaintiff testified he was going 15 
m.p.h. and that he could not see more th'an 30 feet 
' and where in the ordinary reaction time the plaintiff 
during% of a second would h'ave 'traveled 16% feet 
before brakes were applied and would have required 
at least ·an addftional1'8 feet of braking distance, or 
a total stopping distance of 34lf2 feet, this court re-
versed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, saying 
the jury could not have found from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he could have stopped when 
the plaintiff testified he did not see the train until 
the moment of impact and did not apply his brakes 
because he did not have time to apply his brakes. 
It is argued that our sitUJation is much the 
same, and that in fact, the plaintiff in the Benson 
case was more observant than Mr. Johnson in this 
case. Mr. Johnson testified he could have stopped in 
7'5 feet (R. 214), but from his point of observation 
of the danger, he Wlas only three feet from the colli-
sion. According to Mr. Johnson's testimony, he need-
ed an additional 72 feet in which to stop his vehicle 
and avoid a collision. Either Mr. Johnson did not 
look for traffic entering the intersection or didn't 
heed what he saw unless he saw nothing. In any 
event, I submit Mr. Johnson's failure to keep a 
proper lookout made it impossible for him to stop 
within the 11ange of his vision. 
In Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Com-
pany (1'9'32) 80 Utah 3'31, 15 P. 2d 309, this court 
stated: 
12 
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"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished that it is negligence as a m'atter of law 
for a person to drive an automobile upon a 
tt~a.veled public highway, used by vehicles and 
pedestrians, at such a rate of speed 'that said 
automobile cannot be stopped within the dis-
tance at which the operator of said car is able 
to see objects upon the highway in front of 
him." 
In Benson vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., supra., Shiba vs. Weiss ( 195'5) 3 Utah 
2d 256, 282 P. 341, Hirschbach vs. Debuque Pack-
ing Company (1957) 7 Utah 2d 7, 316 P. 2d 319 
this court has indicated it is still committed to the 
rule announced in Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Pro-
dllcts Company, supra. 
In Johnson vs. Syme (19'57) 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 
P. 2d 468, where the plaintiff failed to see a vehicle 
entering the intersection until it was directly in 
front of her, at a distance of 20 to 30 feet away, at 
a time when the car entering the intersection was 
going 10 to 20 m.p.h., 1a summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant was affirmed, and the court said 
that in failing to see the decedent's vehicle until 
she was 20 or 30 fe~t from it, she was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law and thlat she either 
looked and failed to see the obvious or failed to look 
at all, and that under either circumstance she was 
negligent as a matter of law. 
In this case Mr. Johnson did not observe the 
danger of a collision until he was three feet from 
13 
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the point of impact. Plaintiff Johnson in Johnson 
vs. Syme observed the danger when she was 20 to 
30 feet from the point of impact, and it would ap-
pear that she was more observant th'an Mr. Johnson 
here in that she saw the danger when she was 20 
or 30 feet away, and he saw it when he was only 3 
feet away. 
In Conklin vs. Walsh, (1949) 113 Utah 276, 
193 P. 2d 437, this court said the duty to keep a 
proper lookout applies as well to the favored as to 
the disfavored driver, and that neither can excuse 
his own faillure to observe because the other driver 
failed in his duty, and neither is excused for want 
of diligence or failure to see what is plain to be seen. 
Certainly the red truck the defendant was driv-
ing was something plain to be seen if the automo-
bi'le the plaintiff was driving was something to be 
seen. On the basis of either size or color, it should 
have been easier for the plaintiff, Mr. Johnson, to 
have seen the truck than for Mr. James to have seen 
Mr. Johnson's automobile. 
In Martin vs. Ehlers ( 1962) 13 Utah 2d 236, 
271 P. 2d 851, where the jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff and judgment was entered thereon, 
this court reversed the judgment when the plaintiff 
admitted he neither saw the officer's red warning 
light nor did he hear the siren. The court said in 
Martin vs. Ehlers, supra.: 
"Plaintiff said he neither saw the offi-
cer's red warning light, which was attached 
14 
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to the right side at the bottom of the officer's 
windshield, nor did he hear the siren, although 
his window was down. That he saw no red 
light on the officer's car seems credible in the 
light of what may have been a vision obstruc-
tion due to the southbound lines of cars stop-
ped for the traffic light, but his testimony 
tha:t he did not hear the siren, taxes one's 
in1agination. One of our problems is whether, 
under the circumstances here, and as a matter 
of law, plaintiff had the means of hearing but 
did not hear, or having heard, carelessly did 
not heed that which everyone else in the vici-
nity see1ns to have heard and heeded. We think 
he 'vas negligent as a matter of law under the 
reasonable, prudent man principle, and that 
he cannot be inoculated against the principle's 
implications by the simple statement that he 
did not hear what appears to have been audible 
to others at the scene, particularly to two 
complete strangers who volunteered to attest 
to such fact. Were we to espouse any theory 
that one is immune from his actions simply 
because he asserts that he did not hear any-
thing as audible as a police siren within a few 
hundred feet at mos!t, it would be to favor 
the hard of hearing as against the normal, and 
would fracture the traditional standard of 
care attributed to the reasonable, prudent man 
concept. Even with such imperfections as that 
doctrine might possess, and cognizant of the 
fact that the jury system does not always 
function in perfection, those legal materials 
have gone to fashion the best yardsticks that 
have contributed to law and order, in our 
opinion. 
"With great deference to our jury sys-
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~em! and with recognition that we sometimes 
Inchne to .approach I?a:tters ~phoristically, we 
m ~st . review cases In the h~h t of the legal 
principles we espouse and discard reverence 
for a fact-finding agency, where we are con-
vinced it has erred. Here, we believe, is a case 
where that rather rare occasion must be met 
with reversal and without equivocation." 
In this case Mr. Johnson's vision was not ob-
structed by other vehicles, and neither he nor any-
one else has offered any suggestions as to why he 
did not observe the danger sooner. 
The appellant in h:is brief suggests that the case 
of Williams vs. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Insti-
tution ( 19'57) 6 Utah 2d 283, 31'2 P. 2d 564 is con-
trolling, and that the case is beyond this possibility of 
distinction on the facts. With that proposition the 
respondents disagree and submit this case can be 
distinguished from the facts of the Williams case, 
supra. In this case the driver going from the stop 
sign had to go 80', and it took him a period of 10 
seconds to cover that distance, and at the same time 
at the plaintiff's most favorable speed of 20 m.p.h., 
the plaintiff's vehicle was traveling 29.4 feet per 
second or would have been 294 feet away from the 
point of collision. In the Williams case the driver 
coming from the stop sign came in from the right, 
and the plain tiff observed the truck stopped when 
it was only 40' away. It took the plaintiff only ll/2 
seconds to reach the point of impact in the Williams 
case, and in this case the plaintiff had 10 seconds 
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in which to observe the danger and failed to do so. 
In actuality, the appellant in his brief is trying to 
convince this court in citing the Williams case as 
authority that 11/2 seconds equals 10 seconds. The 
respondents submit the aforegoing proposition is 
not a reasonable one and should be rejected. 
In n·illiarru; vs. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile 
ln~titntion, supra., the plaintiff's point of observa-
tion was 25 feet north of the north edge of the in-
tersection as the plaintiff was driving southward. 
Third Avenue was 30 feet wide, and "B" Street was 
40 feet wide. In other words, in the Williams vs. 
Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institution case, su-
pra., the point of observation was made within 25 
feet of entering a narrow intersection, while in this 
case the point of observation was between 1'50 and 
200 feet west of the west curb of Third West, and we 
have 'a situation in which plaintiff's vehicle traveled 
as much as 277' 10" to reach the point of im-
pact as distinguished from the Williams case in 
which the plaintiff's vehicle traveled 43 feet. 
Further, the appell'ant in his brief misstates 
and misleads the court in that Mr. Johnson admitted 
he did not know the speed of the defendant's 
truck, and that he saw it only 3 feet before impact. 
Obviously, in the distance in which he made an ob-
servation he had no chance to reach ~any judgment 
or judge the speed of the truck involved. A complete 
review of the record will show that there are many 
inconsistencies in the plain tiff's testimony as to 
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when he first made his observations and as to what 
he did. However, it is firmly established in this State 
that a party who testifies on h1is own behalf is not 
entitled to go to the jury on an issue unless that 
portion df his own testimony which is least favor-
able to his contentions is of such a character as will 
sustain a verdict in his favor on the issue. 
In Alvarado vs. Tucker (1954) 2 Utah 2d 16, 
268 P. '2d 986, where an action was brought against 
a defendant, and at the trial,at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's evidence the action was dismissed, and 
where upon appeal it was contended that the evi-
dence would support a finding that the defendant 
was speeding, the zone speed being 25 m.p.h., and an 
experienced police officer testifying on direct exam-
ination that the speed was 2'5 to 30 m.p.h., this court 
held that from such testimony a jury could not find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant was traveling in excess of '25 m.p.h. In other 
words a choice of probabilities creates only a basis 
for conjecture, on which 'a verdict cannot s'tand 'and 
does not meet the requirement of a preponderance 
of the evidence. A witnesses' testimony on direct 
examination is no stronger than his modified 
examination, or by his c r o s s examination, and 
a particular part of his testimony may not be 
singled out to the exclusion of other parts of equal 
importance on the subject. 
In Fowler vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Company 
( 1898) 16 Utah 348, 52 P. 594 this court said: 
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"If there is a contradiction, it arises from 
the plaintiff's own testimony. In such 1a case, 
where a non-suit is asked, the trial court may 
consider such testimony true as bears most 
strongly against the interest of the plaintiff." 
In Benson vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., supra, this court affirmed it was 
committed to the rule of Fowler vs. Pleasant Valley 
Coal Company. 
In this particular case the defendant-respon-
dents argue that from the plaintiff's own testimony, 
he has admitted at the time he made his initial ob-
servation (R. 229), his vehicle was 150' to 200' west 
of the west curb of Third West, and that although 
duting the trial he endeavored to move his point of 
observation ahead, in reviewing this testimony from 
the plaintiff, you may consider the evidence as to 
the point from which his initia~l observation was 
made as most strongly bears against the plaintiff. 
Further, with regard to the speed of the defendant's 
truck, he admitted he did not know its speed and 
that he only had three feet in which to observe the 
danger. In other words he did not have sufficient 
time to react and form 'a judgment as to its speed. 
\Ye submit tha:t nothing in the record justifies the 
speed on the part of the truck in excess of 10 m.p.h. 
at the time of collision. Further, since the plaintiff 
admits his speed may have been as much as 25 m.p.h. 
as he approached the intersection, in reviewing this 
matter this court may consider the plaintiff's testi-. 
mony true as bears most strongly against the plain-
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tiff's interests. In other words, this court may as-
sume the plaintiff's vehicle iapproached the intersec-
tion at a speed of 25 m.p.h., and that in actuality, 
1fue plaintiff's vehicle 10 seconds prior to the colli-
sion was 367lj2 feet west of the point of impact, and 
not merely 2'94 feet west, which would have been 
the distance the plaintiff's vehicle would have cov-
ered at only 20 m.p.h. 
In summary it would appear from tlhe facts. 
the plaintiff was not keeping any lookout, and that 
he assumed, merely because he was on an arterial 
street, that he had an absolute right-of-way and no 
obligation to keep a lookout for traffic in or enter-
ing the intersection. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO YIELD 
THE RIGHT-OF-WAY THE PLAINTIFF'S CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
THE AOCIDENT. 
The evidence is clear and certain to the effect 
that the defendant entered the intersection ahead of 
the plaintiff. Before enter-ing the intersection it is 
undisputed th:at Mr. James, the truck driver, made 
!a complete stop and that he waited at the stop sign 
for six or seven cars going west to pass across the 
intersection, and for a period of maybe five seconds 
(R. '249). At the time of the collision Mr. James' 
speed was no more than 10 m.p.h. ( R. 252). On a 
str'aight line (Exhibit No. 1) it shows that the dis-
tance from the north edge of the crosswalk to the 
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point of impact is 80 feet. Further, it is undisputed 
that Mr. James drove southward straight ahead 
and that he did not start his t u r n u n t i 1 he 
was 8' or 10' north of the center line of 2nd South 
Street ( R. 254) . Therefore, in actuality the distance 
the truck traveled from the place where it started 
ahead to the point of collision was somewhat fur-
ther than 80 feet. Mr. James' ave~age speed would 
have been 5 m.p.h. He started art '"0" and reached 
the maximum of 10 m.p.h. At 5 m.p.h. his vehicle 
was going 7.35 feet per second, and it is certain that 
it would have taken the truck sTightly more than 
10 seconds from the time it started ahead until 
the time of the impact. 
Mr. Johnson's speed going east on 2nd South 
was from 20 to 25 m.p.h. At 25 m.p.h. his vehicle 
was gding 36.75 feet per second, or in ten seconds 
at that speed the Johnson vehicle was '36'7 .5 feet 
from the point of collision. Even if you assume the 
speed of Mr. Johnson's vehicle was only 20 m.p.h., 
his vehicle, nevertheless, would have been going 29.4 
feet per second !and was 294 feet from the point of 
imJ>act at the time of the entry. 
In Richards vs. Anderson (1959) 9 Utah 2d 
1 i, 337 P. 2d 59, this court held the plaintiff on 
an arterial highway contributorily negligent as a 
matter of llaw where the defendant driver had wait-
ed at the entrance to an intersection and allowed 
other cars to go by, and thereafter had proceeded 
38 feet into the intersection reaching a speed of 
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10 m.p.h. or an 1average speed of 5 m.p.h., and where 
the driver entering the arterial was traveling 7lf2 
feet per second, and where five seconds elapsed time 
occurred from the time the driver. started into the 
i'ntersection to the time of the collision, and where 
at that time the driver on the arterial Wlas approach-
ing at 15 to 20 m.p.h. and where the driver on the 
arterial was going 15 m.p.h., he would have been 
going 2'2¥2 feet per second and would h'ave travelled 
112¥2 feet, !and where during % of a second in re-
action time at 15 m.p.h. the vehicle on the arterial 
would have traveled 16¥2 feet and would have re-
quired 18 feet for stopping with passable hr3:kes, 
or a total stopping di1stlance of 34¥2 feet, and where 
substracting that distance from 1121;2 feet, it was 
found that the plaintiff has a margin of safety in 
stopping of 78 feet. Further in thiat case the court 
noted that for any increase in the person's speed 
on the arterial, that his opportunity to stop increased 
proportionately. 
By stipulation Exhibit No. 15 was received (R. 
264). Exhibit No. 15 in this case was identical with 
the chart prepared by Traffic Engineer S. S. Taylor 
and published by the Utah Safety Council. Exhibit 
No. 1'5 shows that at a speed of 20 m.p.h. using%, 
of a second reaction time, the plaintiff's vehicle 
would have traveled 212 feet during the reacfion time 
period and with merely paS'sable brakes, an addi-
tional 30 feet would have been required for stopping, 
or the total stopping distance would have been 52 
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feet. Subtracting 52 feet from 294 feet, the distance 
a vehicle will travel in 10 seconds going 20 m.p.h., 
you come up with a margin of safety of 242 feet. 
It is evident that even 'at 20 m.p.h. Mr. Johnson's 
margin of safety in stopping was 24'2 feet or more 
than three times the margin of safety that Mr. 
Richards enjoyed in Richards vs. Anderson, supra, 
where Richards was held contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. At 25 m.p.h. using 3;4 of a second 
reaction time, the chart shows that Mr. Johnson 
would have traveled '27lj2 feet during the reaction 
time period, 1and fuat with merely passable brake'S 
he would have required 47 feet to brake to a stop, 
and that his total stopping distance would have been 
7-l~,S feet. Again, using Sam T·aylor's chart, Exhi-
bit 15, with a stipulated coefficiency of friction of 
45 per cent (R. 266), we find that 'in 10 seconds at 
25 m.p.h. Mr. Johnson's vehi·cle would have traveled 
367 ~ ~ feet, and tha1t his total braking and stopping 
distance required with merely passable brakes would 
have 'been 741f2 feet 1and that he had a margin of 
safety in stopping of 2'9'3 feet. Further, since the 
choice of proba:bilities as to Mr. Jdhn'son's speed 
comes from Mr. John'son's own testimony, the court 
in reViewing this case in en'ti tied to weigh and inter-
pret the evidence as to his speed in the light most 
unfavorable to Mr. Johnson. In Fowler vs. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Company, supra, Benson vs. the Denver 
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, supra, 
and A.lvarado vs. Tucker, supra, ~his court held that 
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where the contradiction arose from the plaintiff's 
own testimony, the trial court may consider such 
testimony as bears most strongly against the inter-
ests of the plaintiff. 
In Hickock vs. Skinner (1948) 11'3 Utah 1, 190 
P. 2d 514, where the plaintiff was traveling north 
on West Temple in Salt Lake City, and at the inter-
section of 2'1st South and West Temple collided with 
the defendant who was going west on 21st South, 
and Where the plaintiff admitted he saw the de-
fendant's vehicle 400 to 500 feet e'ast at the time 
he left the stop sign to cross 21st South, and there-
1after proceeded without looking to the east again, 
and where 2'1st South was 63 feet wide and the 
block along 211st South which the defendant was 
traveling was 660 feet long, and the point of im-
pact was 18 feet south of the north curb of 21st 
South and 9 feet west of the east curb of West 
Temple and 65 feet north from the stop sign facing 
21st South by which the plaintiff entered the inter-
section, and where the police officer testified the 
defendant was going 45 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone, 
and where there were no skid marks, and Where 
the court said if the distance were 400 feet the de-
fendant had to travel, going at a speed of 45 m.p.h., 
for a period of time of six seconds to reach the point 
of collision, and if it were a distance of 500 feet 
it would have taken 71;2 seconds for the defendant's 
car to reach the point of impact from the time it 
left the stop sign, and the defendant's car was not 
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so close as to constitute an immediate ha21ard, and 
that, therefore, the driver on the arterial was re-
quired to yield the right-of-way to the driver enter-
ing. 
Obviously, Hickock vs. Skinner, supra, is author-
ity to the effect that if 1a car on the arterial is be-
tween six and seven and one-half seconds away from 
the point of impact at the time the other vehicle 
leaves the stop sign, it is not so close as to consti-
tute an immediate hazard. Richards vs. Anderson, 
supra, is authority that if a vehicle on the arterial 
is five seconds away from the pdint of impact !at 
the time the vehicle leaves the stop sign, it is not 
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard; so 
it would appear tha:t 1as a matter of law in this case 
where the plaintiff, Calvin Johnson, was 10 seconds 
away from the point of impact at the time our truck 
proceeded into the intersection, the plaintiff's ve-
hicle was not so close 1as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, and that Mr. Johnson could have made a 
safe and smooth stop if he had 'been looking, and 
that he had a duty to yield the right-of-way. 
In Bates vs. Burns ('1955) 3 Utah 180, 281 P. 
2d 290, where the evidence showed the plaintiff 
stopped at a stop sign 12·5 feet south of the point 
of impact and 'then proceeded northerly into the 'in-
tersection and thereafter collided wi fu a westbound 
,,.ehicle on Highway 91 at the 'intersection of High-
way 114 in Pleasant Grove, Utah, and where the 
evidence showed the plain tiff proceeded at a speed 
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of 5 to 6 m.p.h. from the stop sign to the center of 
the highway, and where in fact the plaintiff not only 
entered the intersection first but had nearly passed 
over it before the defendant entered, the court said 
the plaintiff was the disfavored driver until he had 
entered the intersection at a time when no car on 
the through highway had entered or wa:s so close 
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but having 
entered 1as authorized, he 'became the favored driver, 
and all other vehicles approaching the intersection 
on said through highway were obliged to yield the 
righ't-of-way to him. 
Section 4'1-6-7 4 a:s amended in 1961, Utah Code 
Annotated, reads as follows: 
4'1-6-7 4. Vehicle entering a through high-
way. - "The driver of a vehicle shall stop 
as required by this act at the entrance to a 
through high,vay 1and shall yield the right of 
way to other vehicles which have entered the 
intersection from said through highway or 
Which are approaching so closely on said 
~hrough highway as to consti tlite an imme-
diate hazard, but said driver having so yield-
ed may proceed and the drivers of all other v~­
hicles approaching the intersection on sa1d 
highway shall yield the right of way to the 
vehicle so proceeding in to or across the 
furough highway." 
(b) "The driver of a vehicle .shal1like-
wise stop in obedience to a stop sign as re-
quired herein at an intersection where a stop 
sign is erected at one or more entrtances there-
to although not a part of a through highway 
and shall proceed cautiously, yield right of 
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way to vehicles not so obliged to stop which 
are within the intersection or approaching 
so closely as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard, but may then proceed." 
The 1961 amendment substitutes the words, 
"yield right of way" for the word, "yielding" in 
Sub-section (b), and except for this Change, there 
has been no modification in Section 41-6-7 4 since 
Bates vs. Burns, supra. w.as decided. 
Section 41-6-73, which appellant quotes in his 
brief, has no application to the facts or situation 
involved in this accident. Section 4'1-'6-73 applies 
when the vehicle on the arterial is approaching from 
the opposite direction. In this case, Mr. James was 
going south and Mr. Johnson was going ea;st, and 
. south is not opposite to east, and Section 41-6-73 is 
not in point. 
It would appear &at the appellant wishes to 
disregard entirely fue meaning of the words, "or 
approaching so closely as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard." In Richards vs. Anderson, supra., 
in reference as to what was an immediate hazard, 
it states that if the driver on the :arterial must brake 
sharply or suddenly Check his speed to avoi'd a colli-
sion, that he was an immediate hazard to the driver 
entering, and illlat conversely if the driver on the 
the arterial would not be required to go into a sharp 
or sudden braking to avoid a collision, that hi'S car 
was far enough away to have a clear margin to 
observe and make a sm'ooth and safe stop, and was 
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not an immediate hazard, and that he would be 
required to yield to the driver already at the inter-
section. 
In summary it is submitted that Mr. James 
. ' having allowed Mr. Johnson a margin of safety in 
making a smooth and safe stop of 242 feet to 293 
feet, was the favored driver, and fulat as a matter 
of law Mr. Johnson had to yield the right-of-way. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGME·NT FOR THE DEFENDANTS, NON 
OBSTANTE VERE'DJCTO, DID NOT VIOLATE ANY 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
If the facts do not support a claim, absence of 
proof ~annot be supplied by specu1ation, and this 
court has held that granting a juagment of non-
sui1t or a directed verdict in favor of a party is not 
a denial of a constitutional guaranteed right. 
In Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, ( 1948) 113 Utah '2'6, 191 P. 2d 137, where 
tJhe trial court held the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of 11aw, this court affirmed 
say1ng: 
"It has been strenuously argued by plain-
tiff tHa:t ·fuis deci·sion has deprived him of 
his constitutional right to a jury ~rial. Th~t 
contention ha:s been urged upon this court m 
almost every case of non-suit and directed 
verdict brought before us. 'This court is c~arg­
ed with the duty of protecting all of the nghts 
of an of the litigants. This is especfally true 
of those fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the State and Federal Constitutions. But the 
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right to have a jury pass upon issues of fact 
does not include the right to have a cause sub-
mitted to a jury in hope of a verdict where 
the facts undisputably show that the plain-
tiff is not en ti tied to relief." 
In Creamer vs. Ogden Union Railway Co. & 
Depot Co., ( 1952) 121 Utah 406, 242 P ;2d 575, 
where the plain tiff con tended fue court could not 
reverse judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because 
to do so would deny ·plaintiff of a constitutionally 
guaranteed jury trial, thi's court held where facts 
undisputably estal>lished no right to relief, he had 
· no right to have the jury decide the matter. 
The Raymond and Creamer cases, supra. fol-
low the view of the United States Supreme Court. 
In Moore vs. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company 
(1951) 340 U.S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 4'28, 9'5 L. Ed. 547, 
the Supreme Court of the United State·s held that 
where the fa:cts failed to establish a right to relief, 
that there was no right to a jury trial, and that 
speculation by the jury could not supply the place 
of proof. 
In summ·ary tllis argument of plaintiff's coun-
sel merits no further comment. 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE REIN-
STATED. 
The Lower Court erred in instructing the jury 
that being involved in a collision in an intersection 
was prima facie evidence that the plaintiff had the 
right-of-way. However, since the Lower Court con-
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eluded as a matter of law the plaintiff was contri 
butorily negligent, it did not grant the defendanb 
a new trial, but rather granted them a judgmenj 
in their favor, Non Obstante Veredicto. 
The trial court erred prejudiciously in giving 
Instruction 9-F, (R. 48) and Instruction 9-L, (R. 
51) . In Instruction No. 9-F the court instructed 
as follows: 
9-F 
"In this action the Court finds that the 
defendant stopped at the s'top sign, and then 
proceeded in to the intersection of Second 
South and Third West, going in a southerly 
direction and making a left-hand turn to the 
east, wi fuou't keeping a proper lookout for 
traffic in the position of the plaintiff, and 
at a time when it was not safe for 'him to 
enter, and on that ground the Court has 
found, as a matter of law, that the defendant 
was negligent." 
In Instruction 9-F the court said Mr. James was 
negligent as a matter of law in not keeping a proper 
lookout for traffic in the poSi1tion of the pl'aintiff, 
and in entering the intersection when i1t was not 
safe to do so. However, the undisputed testimony 
was that Mr. J:ames stopped his truck (R. 249) and 
that he looked toward the west and saw the plain-
tiff's vehicle 150' to 200' back from the intersec-
tion, (R. 250), and Mr. James started 'into the in-
tersection when he did, as he thought there was no 
danger of colliding with Mr. Johnson's vehicle (R. 
252). Mr. J:a.mes also observed at the time he saw 
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~ll'. Johnson's vehicle that it was going 20 to 25 
m.p.h. ( R. 253), and as such, he thought he could 
·· safely enter. Instruction 9-F unbalanced the case in 
favor of the plaintiff and m:ade it appear to the 
jury that the duty of keeping a lookout was on the 
part of Mr. James; otherwise, why did the court 
'instruct that both drivers were negligent as a mat-
ter of law in failing to see each other and failing 
to keep a proper lookout. And as a practical matter, 
it would appear that Mr. Johnson could have seen 
- Mr. James' larger red truck someWhat ea:sier than 
Mr. James ·could have seen Mr. Johnson's sm'aller 
light colored station wagon. 
Instruction 9-L was more damaging to the de-
~ fendants than :any other instruction, and perh'aps 
_ it is the best explanation and alibi as to why the 
jury returned a verdict at all in favor of the plain-
tiff. Instruction 9-L (R. 51) was as follows: 
'£1The entry of the defendants into :a high-
way con trolled by a stop sign and his being 
involved in a collision in the intersection, in 
this case, is prima facie evidence illlat the 
plaintiff had the right-of-way. 
"We mean by 'prima facie' that on the 
face of it, the plaintiff had ·the right-of-way. 
"If you have in addition to the defendant 
entering the controlled highway, and being 
involved in a collision, additional evidence on 
the subject of negligence in failing to yield 
the right-of-way, you may find that plaintiff 
had a right-of-way, and in tllat event, your 
answer would be "False" on No. 1 (b). But 
if you have additional evidence that over-
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~omes the pri~a facie evidence, then you are 
Instructed to f1nd "True" on Proposition No 
1 (b)." . 
Section 41-6-7 4.10 reads as follows: 
. (a) . In the even.t tha_t a driver, after 
havtng drtven past 1a yteld stgn or a stop sign 
is in'uolved in a collision with a pedestria~ 
having right of way in a crosswalk or a vehicle 
having right of way in the intersection such 
collision shall be deemed prima fiacie evideme 
of his failure to yield the right of way as re-
quired by this section, but shall not be con-
sidered negligence per se in determining legal 
liabilitty for such accident. 
Instruction 9-L says that the fact a collision 
occurred was prima facie evidence the plaintiff 
had the right-of-way, and in effect the trial court 
told the jury that the driver on the arterial only 
had to get hit in a callision to have the right-of-way. 
The question of right-of-way depends on Whether 
or not the plain tiff's vehicle was so close as to con-
stiltute an immediate hazard and not whether there 
is or is not a collision. 
At the time the Motion for a New Trial was 
argued, you will note that Judge Jeppson placed ·an 
'·'X" mark after the word "Section" in Instruction 
9-L and added a footnote in his own handwriting to 
the effect that he should have instructed that if the 
defendants were involved in a collision with a car 
having the right-of-way, that would be prima facie 
evidence, and his pencil note on the instructoin (R. 
51) shows that he concluded he erred in giving this 
instruction. 
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Inadvertently, in preparing the record for 
transmittal to the Supreme Court, the reporter omit-
ted part of the record and failed 'to include all of 
the defendants' exceptions to the court's 'instruc-
tions. The additional transcript and affidavit were 
filed to advise this court that a;t all times defendants 
contended the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper look-
out and in failing to yield the right-of-way to a ve-
, hicle Which was so close as to constitute an 'imme-
diate hazard. 
In summary it is submitted that the defendants, 
having excepted in parti'cular the court's instruc-
tions 9-F and 9-L, that fue judgment cannot be re-
instated even if it 'be assumed plaintiff is not con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment in favor of the de-
fendants, Non Obstante Veredicto, should be affirm-
, ed. As a matter of law the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent 'in failing to yield the right of way 
- to a vehicle which entered the intersection first and 
.. when he was not so close as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard, and furfuer, as a matter of law the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to 
keep a proper lookout when he failed to observe the 
danger of a collision until he was three feet from 
colliding wi'th the defendants' vehicle when he was 
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entering a wide, unobstructed, intersection in th 
daylight. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY, 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Respondents 
203 Executive Building 
45'5 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I hereby certify that on this ________________ day of 
October, 1963, I m'ailed two copies of tllis Brief by 
United States mail, postage prepaid, to Gayle Dean 
Hunt, and two copies to Dwight L. King at the ad-
dresses shown on this Brief. 
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